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sibility of fraud being perpetrated on insurance companies has been
dismissed with a statement that the presence or absence of insurance
in the case was not "an element to be considered." 19 Similarly, the
fact that such a recovery may run counter to public policy is passed
over with a statement by one court to the effect that public policy is
constantly changing.20 Paradoxically enough, the New York courts
have held that a husband's contributory negligence is a complete bar
to recovery in an action for damages for the loss of his wife's ser-
vices. 21 No apparent reason exists for permitting recovery in a
wrongful death action while denying it in an action for loss of
services.
22
Inevitably, the conclusion is reached that some legislative action
should be taken in New York to prevent recovery by a negligent
beneficiary. The ideal solution would be an amendment to the wrong-
ful death statute which would codify the result reached in the instant
case. Thus, recovery would be allowed only to the extent of cost of
recovery and the expenses of administration, burial and last sickness.
X
WILLS-EFFECT OF CONTRACT TO MAKE TESTAMENTARY Dis-
POSITION ON WIDOW'S RIGHT OF ELECTION.-Testator entered into a
separation agreement with his first wife, whereby he contracted to
bequeath to her a life income in his entire estate. This agreement
was later incorporated in a divorce decree. The testator then re-
married. In 1952 he died, leaving a will in conformity with the sep-
aration agreement. His second wife thereupon sought to exercise her
right of election pursuant to Section 18 of the New York Decedent
Estate Law. The Surrogate held that a wife could not be deprived
of her statutory share in her husband's estate by a prior contract to
will his estate to another. Matter of Erstein, 205 Misc. 924, 129
N.Y.S.2d 316 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
The question of whether a contract to devise and bequeath an
estate, made by a testator during his lifetime, could be enforced to the
Supp. 49, 53 (4th Dep't 1900), aff'd mere., 165 N.Y. 667, 59 N.E. 301 (1901) ;
Rozewski v. Rozewski, 181 Misc. 793, 796, 46 N.Y.S.2d 743, 745 (Sup. Ct.
1944).
19 See Rozewski v. Rozewski, supra note 18 at 798, 46 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
20 Id. at 797, 46 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
21 Diem v. Adams, 266 App. Div. 307, 42 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1st Dep't 1943);
Maxson v. Tomek, 244 App. Div. 604, 280 N.Y. Supp. 319 (4th Dep't), motionfor leave to appeal denied, 268 N.Y. 726 (1935).
22 It could be argued that in an action for loss of services the plaintiff sues
in his own capacity, while in a wrongful death action the plaintiff sues in the
capacity of personal representative. See PROSsER, TORTS 421"422, 957 (1941).
However, this is a purely academic distinction, since the recovery in either
action would inure to the benefit of the negligent party.
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exclusion of the widow's right to participate in her husband's estate
first arose in the case of Matter of Hoyt.' There, in a factual situa-
tion similar to the instant case, Surrogate Foley held that a first wife
seeking to enforce such a contract was not a creditor of the estate,
but she merely had an enforceable right in equity to compel the ful-
fillment of the agreement and therefore was a legatee. Having de-
termined that the first wife was a mere legatee, she took subject to
the second wife who was entitled to her right of election.
2
About the same time as the Hoyt case was decided, the Appellate
Division was presented with a similar problem in Brindisi v. Stallone.
3
There it was decided, however, that the first wife was entitled to a
life interest in the testator's estate, and that the second wife took
subject to the first wife. The court held that where the contract was
made in good faith and for a valuable consideration, the second wife
is considered to have married a person who possessed no property
that was subject to devolution at his death. The court took the posi-
tion that she had only an expectancy in her husband's estate, which
could be defeated during his lifetime by several methods, one of which
was a contract to bequeath made in good faith.
The Court in the instant case reviewed both of these conflicting
decisions and, while it agreed with the result reached in the Hoyt
case, it refused to follow the reasoning advanced therein by Surrogate
Foley. The decision, according to Surrogate Collins, should not rest
upon the dubious ground that the first wife is not a creditor. 4 There
are times when she is so considered, as for example, in tax litigation,5
or where the husband agrees to pay alimony for the lifetime of his
divorced wife. 6 It was pointed out that the "good faith" test of the
1 174 Misc. 512, 21 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
2 The holding of the Hoyt case was followed in the recent case of Matter
of Lewis, 123 N.Y.S.2d 859 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
3 259 App. Div. 1080, 21 N.Y.S.2d 29 (2d Dep't 1940).
4 See Matter of Erstein, 205 Misc. 924, 930, 129 N.Y.S.2d 316, 322 (Surr.
Ct. 1954).
5See Matter of Brokaw, 180 Misc. 490, 493, 41 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59 (Surr.
Ct. 1943), aff'd men., 267 App. Div. 811, 46 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1st Dep't), aff'd,
293 N.Y. 555, 59 N.E.2d 243 (1944) ; Matter of Strebeigh, 176 Misc. 381, 386,
27 N.Y.S.2d 569, 576-577 (Surr. Ct. 1941) (The decedent's first wife was not
required to contribute towards the estate tax, as her annuity was considered a
charge on the estate.).
6 As a general rule the husband's obligation to pay alimony ceases upon his
death. See Wilson v. Hinman, 182 N.Y. 408, 412, 75 N.E. 236, 238 (1905);
Murray v. Murray, 278 App. Div. 183, 189, 104 N.Y.S.2d 44, 49 (1st Dep't),
aff'd men., 303 N.Y. 700, 103 N.E.2d 59 (1951). However, where the husband
agrees not only to obligate himself for alimony payments during his lifetime,
but also to continue such payments for his wife's lifetime, then the first wife
is a creditor of the estate for the amount of such payments. See Matter of
Gray, 176 Misc. 829, 832-833, 29 N.Y.S.2d 123, 126-127 (Surr. Ct. 1941), aff'd
mere., 266 App. Div. 732, 41 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1st Dep't 1943), aff'd mem., 292
N.Y. 532, 54 N.E.2d 380 (1944). Where a husband contracts to make periodic
alimony payments to his first wife and also to make a testamentary disposition
for her, she is considered a creditor of the estate under the first provision and
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Brindisi case was erroneous, since the courts are not concerned with
the motives of the husband but only with whether the transaction was
real or illusory.7
Instead, the Court stated that the testamentary disposition of
one's property is not a matter of right, but rather a privilege granted
by the legislature. Because it is a privilege, certain conditions and
restrictions may be imposed.8 Therefore, the testator in the principal
case, having decided upon this method of paying alimony, could do
so only in so far as the provisions of the agreement did not conflict
with any statutory restraint upon the right of disposition. The Court
looked to the broad public policy behind Section 18 and determined
that it prohibits a husband from binding himself by contract to devise
and bequeath his property in a manner that would deprive the sur-
viving spouse of her statutory rights. Furthermore, Section 18 was
enacted to correct the evils that existed under the common law,
whereby a husband, who was legally obligated to support his wife
during his lifetime, could prevent her from participating in his estate
by failing to provide for her in his will.9 Because this section is
remedial in nature, it has been liberally construed in favor of the sur-
viving •spouse.10  For the same reason, the courts jealously protect
this right of the spouse and are quick to detect any evasion or prac-
tices that would frustrate the purpose of the statute.,' The instant
case offers an excellent example of such protection.
As stated in the Brindisi case, a wife has a mere expectancy in
her husband's estate and a husband is free to dispose of all his prop-
erty during his lifetime. This form of disinheritance is valid under
our present laws; Section 18 does not prevent such a disposition.' 2
a legatee under the second. Cf. Matter of Lewis, supra note 2 at 862-863. Where
provision is made for the first wife in the form of a testamentary trust, the
corpus may be so large that the second wife would be denied her statutory
share. Faced with this problem, the courts have evaluated the first wife's
interest by reference to mortality tables and settled the estate accordingly. See,
e.g., Matter of Lewis, supra.
7 See Matter of Erstein, supra note 4 at 932, 129 N.Y.S.2d at 324.
8 The New York Decedent Estate Law imposes various limitations, e.g.,
Section 21 (prescribes form of a will) ; Sections 10 and 15 (who can make a
will); Section 17 (the amount that may be devised or bequeathed in certain
instances).
9 See 1928 LEG. Doc. No. 70, REPORT, DECEDENT ESTATE COMmIssIoN
18-20 (Reprint ed. 1935).
10 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 163 Misc. 946, 299 N.Y. Supp. 55 (Sup.
Ct. 1937), af'd, 254 App. Div. 601, 2 N.Y.S.2d 858 (3d Dep't 1938) ; Matter
of Harris, 150 Misc. 758, 271 N.Y. Supp. 464 (Surr. Ct. 1934) ; see Matter of
Collins, 156 Misc. 783, 785, 282 N.Y. Supp. 728, 732 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
"1 See, e.g., Matter of Curley, 245 App. Div. 255, 280 N.Y. Supp. 80 (2d
Dep't), aft'd men., 269 N.Y. 548, 199 N.E. 665 (1935); Matter of Byrnes,
141 Misc. 346, 252 N.Y. Supp. 587 (Surr. Ct. 1931), aff'd mere., 235 App. Div.
782, 257 N.Y. Supp. 884 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd, 260 N.Y. 465, 184 N.E. 56(1933).
12 See Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 374, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937) ; Spafford
v. Pfeffer, 179 Misc. 867, 871, 39 N.Y.S.2d 831, 835 (Sup. Ct 1943).
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The above preclusion can be accomplished in a variety of ways: the
husband may make an inter vivos transfer,13 establish a trust,14 or
set up a Totten trust. 5 The court in the Brindisi case, however,
failed to distinguish between the aforementioned procedures and that
of contracting away one's estate. In the former, with the exception
of a Totten trust,'( the party must give up complete control over the
property or the transfer will be considered illusory by the courts and
set aside at the instance of the decedent's widow.' 7 Experience has
shown, however, that since man is not naturally inclined to surrender
all his property during his life, these transactions do not constitute
a serious threat to a widow. Such a natural restraint is not present
where one contracts away his estate. In such an instance, the hus-
band is free to exercise absolute dominion and control over his prop-
erty during his lifetime. It would be anomalous indeed to set aside
inter vivos trusts and transfers on the ground that the testator re-
tained a degree of control over the property which rendered the
transfer illusory, if the testator could accomplish the same result by
contracting away his estate. Had the Court refused to permit the
wife to exercise her right of election in this instance, Section 18 would
have been open to evasion and, for all practical purposes, reduced to
a nullity.
13 See, e.g, Spafford v. Pfeffer, supra note 12; Matter of Schurer, 157 Misc.
573, 284 N.Y. Supp. 28 (Surr. Ct. 1935), aff'd inem., 248 App. Div. 697, 289
N.Y. Supp. 818 (1st Dep't 1936).
14 See President and Directors of the Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 172 Misc.
290, 297, 14 N.Y.S.2d 375, 384 (Sup. Ct. 1939), modified, 260 App. Div. 174,
21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1940).
15 Matter of Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951).
16 In a Totten trust, the depositor may retain some control because the trust
is tentative in nature. It does not become absolute until the death of the de-
positor or until the gift is completed during the depositor's lifetime by some
unequivocal act or declaration, such as a transfer of the bankbook to the bene-
ficiary. See Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 126, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904).
However, it is not likely that the husband would adopt this method of distri-
bution since it necessitates the liquidation of his assets and the establishment
of a bank account.
17 Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937); see Hirschfield
v. Ralston, 66 N.Y.S.2d 59, 61 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Marano v. LoCarro, 62
N.Y.S.2d 121, 126-127 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 270 App. Div. 999, 63 N.Y.S.2d
829 (1st Dep't 1946).
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